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1 INTRODUCTION
THE Information Processing Factory (IPF) project hasrecently introduced the abstraction of complex archi-
tectures as self-aware information processing factories [1],
[2]. These factories consist of a set of highly configurable re-
sources, e.g., processing elements and interconnects, whose
use is monitored, planned, and configured during run-
time. Managing a factory involves multiple facets, such
as efficiency, availability, reliability, integrity, and timing.
IPF conquers the complexity of managing facets in digital
systems by hierarchically decomposing the challenges and
addressing them with different co-existing entities in the
factory.
This paper introduces the organization, terminology, and
definitions of IPF. Section 2 describes IPF’s five-layer hierar-
chical organization and a system configuration framework
that enable self-awareness, self-diagnosis, self-organization,
and self-optimization in mixed-critical real-time embedded
systems. Section 3 defines imminent hazards, which are
threats to the system operation that can be handled by IPF
before they can cause system failure. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 IPF’S 5-LAYER ORGANIZATION
IPF is a metaphor for self-aware, self-organizing, mixed-
critical systems. IPF provides an infrastructure for system
introspection and reflective behavior, which is the founda-
tion for computational self-awareness. Computational self-
awareness is the ability of a computing system to recognize
its own state, possible actions and the result of these actions
on itself, its operational goals, and its environment, thereby
empowering the system to become autonomous [3]. An IPF
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system consists of a set of highly configurable resources
whose use is planned, configured, monitored, and opti-
mized at runtime. The system resources are allocated to the
execution of mixed-critical workloads. Thus, not only must
the factory manage resources and workload at runtime, it
must do so while ensuring that the requirements of the
safety-critical functions of the workload are not violated.
IPF addresses that challenge with two levels of awareness: a
first level with local, autonomous actions and a second level
with a global view of the system. Together, they ensure the
adaptability, safety, and dependability of the mixed-critical
system throughout its execution.
Resembling a factory1, IPF is organized in five layers, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The workload execution occurs in the
production line (layer 1), which contains the system resources
and the mixed-critical workload. The workload executes
within the infrastructure and execution model of the process
support (layer 2), which provides basic execution support
such as the operating systems (OSs), real-time operating
systems (RTOSs), and the runtime environments (RTEs). The
resources’ statuses are monitored and the workload exe-
cution is optimized by the supervisory process control (layer
3), which acts locally and autonomously within boundaries
specified by the layers above. The manufacturing execution
control (layer 4) is responsible for enforcing safe system
configurations by globally monitoring, assessing risks and
controlling the layers below, under the guidance of the top
layer. The enterprise resource planning (layer 5) is responsible
for long-term planning of IPF. It plans future proactive
and reactive actions, taking into account the operating
conditions of the system, assessing risks and impacts of
short-term factors such as error rates, energy consumption,
workload variations; and long-term factors such as aging,
energy constraints, and changes in the workload, quality-
of-service (QoS) goals, and non-functional constraints. Note
that, in the absence of the top three layers, layers 1 and 2
compose the original non-self-aware system.
2.1 Production Line (Layer 1)
The lowest layer of IPF is responsible for the workload
execution. Depicted in Figure 1, the production line consists
of the system resources and the mixed-critical workload.
1. Terminology inspired by enterprise control systems [4].
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Fig. 1. IPF’s five-layer organization.
The mixed-critical workload consists of a best-effort (BE)
component and a safety-critical (SC) component. The BE
workload is characterized by its goals, and the SC workload
is characterized by its non-functional requirements. The BE
workload has application-specific QoS, such as achieved
throughput, and also has system constraints such as power
budget. The SC workload has requirements, such as pe-
riod, worst-case execution time (WCET), deadline, maxi-
mum downtime, maximum failure in time (FIT), and data
consistency. Different levels of criticality [5] as defined in
safety standards [6], [7], [8] are also supported. The five
usual levels of criticality – e.g., Automotive Safety Integrity
Levels (ASILs) A through D plus QM, are captured by the
different requirements of the workload. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, throughout the paper we refer to
the two representative levels: BE and SC.
Processing resources are highly configurable and char-
acterized by their properties – e.g., operating frequencies,
power consumption, temperature, and error rates. They can
consist of a single or multiple cores in a cluster. Processing
resources can be used for executing either BE or SC work-
load. Therefore, IPF requires them to have a safety-critical
mode where the execution is deterministic, predictable, and
enables minimum performance guarantees for applications
that require it – i.e., the SC workload. For BE workload exe-
cution, processing resources can enable non-predictable fea-
tures, such as caches in the memory hierarchy and dynamic
voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS). Shared resources
must provide predictable and deterministic service and en-
sure sufficient independence2 between different criticalities
[7], thereby enabling minimum performance guarantees for
the SC workload. The resources are configured by the man-
ufacturing execution control (layer 3), which enables and
disables configurable features according to the executing
2. Also known as freedom from interference [6].
workload.
Processing resources in IPF have five different states and
two superstates, as illustrated in Figure 2. A processing
resource can either be operational or non-operational. When
operational, a processing resource can be allocated to the
SC workload execution or the BE workload execution. In
the former case, the respective processing resource belongs
to the SC zone, and in the latter, to the BE zone. When
non-operational, e.g., due to errors, the processing resource
can be either under maintenance or failed. If a processing
resource is under maintenance, IPF attempts to find a con-
figuration under which the resource can still be employed.
When failed, the resource is no longer usable. The resource
planning is done in layer 5. The resource management is
done at layer 4, which is responsible for the different tran-
sitions. Shared resources are managed similarly and serve
both SC and BE zones.
Under 
mainten
ance
Failed/
disabled
Available
BE zone
SC zone
Non-operational
Operational
SC+BEC
SC
Fig. 2. Resource states: resource planning is done in layer 5, resource
management (state transitions) is done in layer 4.
2.2 Process Support (Layer 2)
The second layer of IPF is responsible for basic workload
execution support and the execution model. The process
support comprises elements such as OSs, RTOSs, and RTEs,
as illustrated in Figure 1. Notice that the lowest two layers
3alone comprise a regular mixed-critical system without any
self-* properties.
For modularity and to enable predictable dynamicity at
runtime, the execution model of IPF is based on containers.
A container encapsulates a (sub)set of either SC or BE work-
load, and is referred to as an SC container or a BE container,
respectively. A container also includes an RTE with OS or
RTOS, and a software stack. Each container is mapped to
a processing resource, which is associated with a single
container – i.e., there exists a strict one-to-one mapping
between containers and processing resources. The mapping
of workload to containers and the mapping of containers
to resources are specified in Operating Regions (ORs), to be
introduced in Section 2.3. At runtime, the workload can be
redistributed among different containers, and containers can
be moved between resources, e.g., with workload balancing
and migration techniques. That can be carried out by entities
in layers 4 and 5 by means of transitions between ORs.
2.3 Operating Regions and Operating Points
Before advancing to the next layers, we define the concepts
of ORs and Operating Points (OPs). The vision for OPs
was introduced in [2]. Here, we apply the concept in a
framework for configuring and managing the system. The
framework consists of ORs and OPs. An OR is a config-
uration of the system with room for small changes. Small
changes are carried out by changing the OPs inside it. Larger
changes are carried out by changing the OR.
An OR represents a configuration of the system where
the mixed-critical workload (including goals and require-
ments), its mapping to BE and SC containers, the mapping
of containers to resources, and the configuration of the
shared resources are fixed. In an OR, the configuration of
the containers and the associated processing resources (in
the BE zone) can be varied. What can be varied depends on
the specific instance of IPF and on the underlying hardware.
How much it can be varied, i.e., the configuration range, is
determined at runtime in layer 5, introduced in Section 2.6.
Both what can be varied and how much it can be varied are
specified in the OR. The intuition behind ORs is that they
represent valid system configurations where the system is
predictable and safe for executing the SC workload, while
still providing safely bounded flexibility for local optimiza-
tions of the execution of BE workload.
An OP is a specific configuration within an OR. It can
also be decomposed in two components, and be defined as
a pair: OP = (OPSC ,OPBE). The OPBE represents a specific
configuration of the BE zone, and OPSC represents a specific
configuration of the SC zone. The concept is illustrated in
the top left quadrant of Figure 3b, where there are multiple
operating points within a region. The intuition behind OPs
is that they represent a specific, valid configuration at any
given point in time within an OR.
As illustrated in Figure 3b, the system starts at an initial,
valid OR, named Current Operating Region (COR). A num-
ber of autonomous actions can be performed locally by the
system, which move the OP around inside the COR. When-
ever an event occurs in IPF that requires bigger changes to
the configuration, IPF handles it by transitioning to a new
OR, named Next Operating Region (NOR). A suitable NOR
is chosen from a set N of NORs and IPF then reconfigures
the system according to the selected NOR, which becomes
the COR. Then, the set N of NORs becomes empty and new,
valid NORs must be created and added to N .
Events can be triggered due to different reasons, such as:
• anticipated violation of the requirements of the safety-
critical workload, i.e., a hazard;
• pursuit of long-term optimization goals;
• changes in the workload, its goals and requirements;
• changes in the environmental conditions;
• changes in the operating conditions.
Events are generated by the entities in layers 3 and 4 and
will be introduced in the respective layers.
2.4 Supervisory Process Control (Layer 3)
The supervisory process control is responsible for monitor-
ing and autonomously optimizing the workload execution.
It is also responsible for gathering useful information about
the production line that supports the upper layers’ long-
term planning and execution. Supervisory process control
components carry out actions that directly modify the con-
figuration of the system by changing its OP. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the layer comprises the IPF infrastructure compo-
nents Trace Abstraction Layer (TAL) and Learning Classifier
Table (LCT).
TAL is responsible for monitoring the system for errors.
TAL is a source of events that trigger OR transitions. TAL
performs runtime verification based on processor tracing.
It checks the execution of the workload against contracts
(system requirements) described as Timed Automata (TA)
models. The contracts are loaded into TAL, which continu-
ously monitors the system at runtime. TALs operate in both
BE and SC containers.
The LCT is responsible for optimizing the execution of
the BE workload towards achieving goals. LCTs [9] are
rule-based reinforcement learning engines that explore and
optimize configurations within the COR. They operate only
within BE containers. LCTs collect periodic sensor data to
update the fitness of rules and determine the action for the
next period. First, based on the effect of the previous action
toward achieving an objective, the LCT updates the rule
fitness for the previous period using a version of Q-learning.
Second, based on the current state and rule fitnesses, the
LCT applies an action to configure the system for the
upcoming period by changing the OP within the COR (cf.
Section 2.3). LCTs and TALs are configured and maintained
by layer 3.
2.5 Manufacturing Execution Control (Layer 4)
In the factory analogy, the manufacturing execution control
is responsible for the global monitoring, risk assessment,
and control of the system. It monitors the layers below with
the support of layer 3 and controls them by means of the
ORs provided by the enterprise resource planning (layer 5).
Changes to the system configuration initiated by this layer
are seen as big changes and are realized with transitions
from a COR to a NOR (cf. Section 2.3).
As illustrated in Figure 1, the layer comprises two enti-
ties: the best-effort controller (BEC) and the system controller
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Fig. 3. Operating regions: Current Operating Region (COR) and the set of Next Operating Region (NOR), triggered by different events (α, β, and
γ). An operating region can have multiple valid Operating Points (OPs).
(SC). SC monitors and controls the safety-critical part of
the system (the SC zone) as well as the shared resources
according to the COR. BEC monitors and controls the best-
effort part of the system, the BE zone, according to the COR.
SC coordinates the control of the BE zone with BEC, but for
safety, SC has ultimate control over the entire system.
The SC is responsible for configuring the system accord-
ing to the COR. It configures the resources and the entities
in the lower layers of IPF, loads the SC and BE containers
onto the respective resources, and configures the shared
resources as specified by the COR. The BEC is responsible
for configuring the resources and entities in the BE zone
according to the COR, and ensures that the autonomous
actions carried out in the lower layers are within the speci-
fication of the COR.
Both entities globally monitor the system, assess risks,
and proactively and reactively act to changes in the system
or environment. These proactive and reactive measures in
the system are triggered by events (cf. Section 2.3), which
trigger big changes in the configuration of the system.
Events are generated either in layer 3 or in this layer. SC
monitors the system for changes in the environmental or
operating conditions that impact the execution of the SC
workload. Similarly, BEC monitors the BE zone for changes
in the system or environment that impacts the execution of
the BE workload. Events refer to, for example, changes in
the BE workload and its goals, changes in the SC workload
and its requirements, or the failure of a processing resource,
which will be reactively handled in IPF. An event can also
refer to a predicted change that will be proactively handled
by IPF, such as the imminent failure of a processing re-
source. Because changes in the global system configuration
impact the SC workload execution, SC is responsible for
handling all events, including events that occur in the BE
zone, which are forwarded by BEC to SC. Handling the
event means transitioning from the COR to a suitable NOR
associated with that event.
Transitions from the COR to NORs are carried out by SC
with the collaboration of BEC. Such transitions can include
changes to the configuration of a single resource or can
include a complete change in the mapping of workload
to containers and their mapping to resources. During a
transition, in addition to the above-described configuration
responsibilities, resources can be added and removed from
the SC and BE zones. The management of a resource’s state
by the SC and BEC controllers is illustrated in Figure 2,
where solid-arrow changes to the resource state involve only
SC, and dashed-arrow transitions involve both SC and BEC.
When the SC and BE zones are resized, i.e., resources are
added to or removed from a zone, a controller appropriately
releases its resources before handing them over to the other
one – e.g., BEC removes a resource from the BE zone before
handing it over to SC to be added to the SC zone. Notice
that the transition of a resource from BE zone to SC zone in
Figure 2 is timing critical. Therefore, SC is allowed to force-
fully execute that transition without BEC, in case the latter
takes too long to release it, in order to make the execution of
the SC workload independent of the execution of the BE
workload (sufficient independence). Shared resources are
configured by SC since they must comply with the high-
est levels of criticality [6], and they must be reconfigured
before any BE containers can resume execution in order
to ensure sufficient independence and prevent unexpected
interference on the execution of the SC workload. Note that
the time to transition between ORs varies depending on the
amount of reconfiguration involved.
When an event occurs for which there is no associated
NOR, the reaction of IPF depends on the event. The possible
scenarios are summarized in Table 1. In case the event is
related to the execution of the SC workload, the system
must signal its failure before the non-functional properties
of the workload are violated. The failure is either reported
immediately if the event concerns a reactive measure, or it
can be deferred to when the failure actually occurs if the
event concerns a proactive measure. If the event is related
to the execution of BE workload, the system continues
operating albeit with limited QoS, which can be optionally
reported. Such scenarios can be triggered either because
there are actually no more valid NORs for that event,
e.g., due to a number of resource failures leading to an
insufficient number of resources, or because a valid NOR
has not been created yet (but eventually will), e.g., due to a
5quick succession of events.
TABLE 1
Failure scenarios in IPF where an event concerning either BE or SC
workload has no associated NOR with a reactive or proactive measure.
Reactive Proactive
BE workload Limited QoS (optional)
SC workload Failure report Deferred failure report
2.6 Enterprise Resource Planning (Layer 5)
Finally, the enterprise resource planning is responsible for
the long-term planning of the system. That is, developing
the future configurations of the system in the form of NORs.
The planning is supported by system information supplied
by layers 3 and 4, including the resources and their current
operating conditions. Planning also considers the system’s
current and previous ORs; current and previous operating
conditions; the workload, its QoS goals and non-functional
constraints; short-term and long-term factors, such as error
rates, energy consumption, aging, and energy constraints;
and the different events that may occur at runtime.
The planner is the main entity of this layer. Its main
responsibility is to create and maintain the set N of NORs.
N is modified when IPF transitions to a NOR, which re-
quires a new set of NORs, and N is therefore emptied;
and when the planner creates a new, valid NOR, in which
case a new NOR is added to N . The planner also defines
the valid OPs in ORs – i.e., the configuration ranges in
an OR within which IPF’s local autonomous actions and
optimization in layer 3 can operate. That is required due to
possible coupling between system resources. For example,
physical temperature coupling, where the high temperature
of a processing resource can affect neighboring resources
and increase their error rates.
An OR is a valid configuration range of the system,
and therefore the planner only includes a new NOR in the
set N if it meets all non-functional requirements of the
SC workload. That includes checking the ORs and their
OPs with, e.g., system-level performance analysis tools such
as Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA) [10]. The
planner can take the QoS goals of the BE workload into
consideration, but there is no guarantee that the goals will
be met in a given OR.
The transitions between different ORs are triggered by
different events. Independent of the event, the planner
must consider the cost of transitioning between different
ORs. Transitions can involve the remapping of workload
to containers and the remapping of containers to resources.
Remapping requires moving code and data and therefore
impacts the response time of the executing workload, which
can lead to system-level timing violations (deadline misses).
Thus, the planner must also check for system-level timing
and safety violations of the transition from the COR to the
NOR before the NOR can be included in the set N .
3 IMMINENT HAZARDS
IPF goes beyond conventional hardware faults by ad-
dressing imminent hazards. Intuitively, a hazard is a conse-
quence of the system failing to function as expected. From
ISO 26262, a failure is the termination of the ability of the
system or sub-system to perform a function as required [6].
A hazard is a potential source of harm caused by the mal-
functioning behaviour of the system, i.e., a system failure
[6]. An imminent hazard can then be defined as follows:
Definition 1. Imminent hazard: an increased risk of future
errors that can lead to system failure and, therewith, a hazard.
An imminent hazard can be caused by physical causes,
environmental conditions, or operating conditions. They
can be caused, e.g., by the imminent failure of a resource
due to an impending permanent fault. When a permanent
fault is close to occur due to aging processes, increasing
error rates and intermittent faults are observed [11]. In this
case, imminent hazards must be distinguished from latent
faults and regular fault occurrences. Imminent hazards can
also be caused by error rates for which the system is not
dimensioned to tolerate.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper described IPF’s five-layer hierarchical organiza-
tion and system configuration framework, and defined the
concept of imminent hazards.
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